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I. INTRODUCTION 
Historians of economics and philosophy have noted Georg Wilhelm 
Fredrich Hegel's debt to Adam Smith and have suggested that Hegel's 
analysis of civil society rests on a Smithian foundation. Laurence Dickey 
recognized that "Hegel's interest in the Scots coincided with the late 
eighteenth-century German interest in the relationship between socioeco-
nomic processes in history and the development of civil institutions" 
(Dickey 1987, p. 194). Georg Lukacs emphasized that "it is highly probable 
that the study of Adam Smith was a turning-point in Hegel's evolution" 
(Lukacs 1976, p. 172). In his study of The Formation of the Economic 
Thought of Karl Marx, Ernest Mandel maintained that Marx discovered 
political economy and its importance to philosophy in his reading of Hegel. 
Says Mandel: 
[Hegel] had been profoundly affected in his youth by economic 
studies, in particular by the work of Adam Smith; Marx saw the 
Hegelian system as a veritable philosophy oflabor. [Quoting Pierre 
Naville:] "When he read the Phenomenology of Mind, the Philoso-
phy of Right, and even the Science of Logic, Marx thus not only 
discovered Hegel but already, through him, was aware of that part 
of classical political economy which was assimilated and translated 
into philosophical terms in Hegel's work; so that Marx would not 
have gone into his systematic criticism of civil society and the state 
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accor.ding to Hegel. if he had not found in the latter's writings 
certam elements whl~h ~ere still live, such as the theory of needs, 
the theory of appropnatlOn, or the analysis of the division of labor" 
(Mandel 1971, pp. 11-12). 
Hegel's Jena Lec.tures of 1~03-1806, Jenenser Realphilosoplzie I and II, 
r~v~al that he was mdeed usmg Smith's Wealth of Nations in a manner 
slI~llar to Marx's later use of it in the Economic and Philosophic Mallu-
SC':lptS.1 Accordin~ to Z. A. Pelczynski, in the 1805-1806 Lectures, "Hegel tne~ hard to theonze, but although he describes the effects of industrial 
society on human powers in vivid terms reminiscent of Marx, he is not yet ~ble to produce a systematic theory of civil society, still less to integrate it 
mto a more comprehensive social and political philosophy" (Pelczynski 
1984, p. 5). 
Yet that Smith's findings continued to influence Hegel's later writings, if 
less obviously so, is recognized both by Paul Charnley and by Shlomo 
Avineri. Avineri comments: 
Mechanization and industrialization are ... the necessary conse-
quences of civil society. Thus civil society reaches its apex - and it 
is here that Hegel integrates the Smithian model of a free market 
into his philosophical system, by transforming Smith's 'hidden 
hand' into dialectical reason working in civil society, unbeknownst 
to its own members. Self-interest and self-assertion are the motives 
of activity in civil society; but these can be realized by the individual 
only through inter-action with others and recognition by them. The 
mutual dependence of all on all is inherent in every individual's 
self-oriented action ... AdaJil Smith is thus aufgehoben - both pre-
served and transcended-into the Hegelian system (Avineri 1972, 
pp. 146-47; see also Charnley 1965, pp. 252-55). 
Mandel also confirms Smith'S continuing influence on Hegel in his 
review of certain elements of the economic content of Hegel's philosophi-
cal writings. Hegel's philosophy of labor is introduced in his System of 
Ethical Life (System der Sittlichkeit), developed to its fullest extent in the 
J ena Lectures and in the Phenomenology of Mind, then defended critically 
in the Philosophy of Right and the Science of Logic. The relationship 
1. We know that Smith'S Wealth of Nations was translated into '.ierman soon a~tcr it 
'ppe"ed. "Ooe ,o\ume of ,he fi~' GO'm'o ,,,,,\"'00 (by T. F. SdullO') ",me. out m ,he 
same year as the Wealth of Nations itself. Before the (18th) century closed, thiS Gcr~an 
translation had passed through three editions; meanwhile a secon.d much better tra?slal1o
n
, 
which the popular philosopher Christian Garbe [sic) brought out In 1786 had met ~It~ grcat 
success, (Palyi 1928, p.184). It was Garve's 1794-1796 translation which Hegcl studied In Jena 
and cited in his lectures, Jenenser Realphi/osophie I and /I. 
186 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
between human need and labor is first touched upon in his System of Ethical 
Life. In his mature works, this becomes "a real dialectic between need and 
labor and thus [Hegel] arrived at a twofold definition of labor as alienating 
and alienated" (Mandel 1976, p. 155). Moreover, this alienation expands 
into the alienation of whole economic classes, the contradictions between 
the extremes of poverty and wealth that is characteristic of modern indus-
trial nations.2 Thus though Hegel's debt to Smith is most apparent in his 
early Jena Lectures, it is fair to conclude that Smith's original influence on 
Hegel is "preserved and transcended" in the mature Hegelian system. 
Indeed, Riedel claims that "Hegel's assimilation of the most advanced 
theories of political economy, as found in the classical British thinkers from 
James Steuart to Adam Smith and in the Philosophy of Right of 1821 David 
Ricardo, had no parallel in German idealistic philosophy" (Riedel 1984, p. 
108). How Hegel's understanding of Smith developed and how he trans-
formed Smith's thought is central to both an understanding of Hegel's 
philosophical writing and an appreciation of the extent of Adam Smith's 
influence outside of Great Britain and outside of economics. Discussion 
here investigates Hegel's adoption of Smith's thought in the early Jena 
Lectures and in the later Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Right. 
Hegel's first systematic encounter with political economy was his study of 
Sir James Steuart's Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy.3 As a 
result of his reading of Steuart, Hegel saw the problem of personal 
fragmentation, alienation, less in terms of religious structures and more in 
terms of economic phenomena. Raymond Plant, drawing on the research 
of Paul Chamley, concludes that Hegel derived three major insights from 
his reading of Steuart's Inquiry. "First, there was the beginnings of a 
philosophy of history which enabled him to take up a far more positive 
attitude towards the development of modern society" (Plant 1980, p. 64). 
Thus Hegel concluded that the dialectic had relevance beyond logical 
method, for it was the key to understanding historical processes. For Hegel, 
history moves dialectically. Next, "from Steuart's theory of the statesman, 
he derived a very distinctive theory about the role of the state vis-a-vis 
modern commercial society" (ibid.). Yet, as we shall see, Hegel also found 
2. E. Mandel summarizes Hegel's economics and their influence on the development of 
Marx's thought in Chapter 10 of his The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx. 
Others, in addition to Avineri and Plant, who have recognized Marx's debt to Hegel include 
Roman Rosdolsky (in the preface to his The Making of Marx's "Capital'), Martin Nicolaus (in 
his foreword to Gmndrisse), and R. P. Bellamy (in his article "Hegelianism" in The New 
Pa/grave). In contrast, Herbert Marcuse (in his Reason and Revolution) fails to see any 
Smithian influence. 
3. Laurence Dickey summarized his own reasons "why James Steuart's views on political 
economy found such a receptive audience" (Dickey 1987, p.196; see also pp.197 -99). Michael 
Perelman suggests that Steuart's discussion of price theory may have contributed to Hegel's 
dialectical thinking. 
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Smit~'s laiss~z-faire dictums appropriate. Finally, of particular importance 
to thIS study IS Hegel's adoption of Steuart's "idea that the development of 
the exchange economy caused an increase in human freedom and self-
~ev~~o~~ent, but which at the same time yields its own forms of integra-
tIOn (.IbId.). Elsewhere Plant notes that reading Steuart led Hegel to 
reconsIder the problem of personal fragmentation as a consequence of 
changes in the economic structure rather than religious structures (Plant 
1983, p. 23). Furthermore, Dickey concludes that "it is perfectly possible 
and even probable that Hegel read Smith and Steuart as complements to 
each other rather than _ as the conventional view would have it - as spokes-
men for two different antithetical interpretations of the purposes of'politi-
cal economy'" (Dickey 1987, p. 199). 
Changes in the structure of the economy were also the focus of another 
writer of the Scottish Enlightenment, Adam Ferguson (1723-1816). Dickey 
argues that the influence of this Scottish writer is clear. Yet even here, 
Smith's thought was at work. Without entangling ourselves in the contro-
versy surrounding Smith's charges of plagiarism, let us merely quote c.R. 
Fay's comment that "Ferguson, as philosopher, and Millar, as lawyer, 
looked with interest over the fence at the new plant of political economy, 
which Adam Smith was raising. By no means economists themselves ... they 
drew on it for occasional illustration" (Fay 1956, p. 91).4 Thus Smith's 
influence on Hegel was, at first, indirect, coming through the writings of 
Ferguson. While, "the human consequences of the growing differentiation 
offunction and the development of commercial society was not the primary 
focus of the Scottish historians .. .it did ... strike a deep chord. among the 
German" philosophers (Plant 1983, p. 22). Not only did Hegel draw on 
Ferguson'swork, but, as Ferguson himself had done, Hegel tur.ne~ toAd~m 
Smith for a better, deeper understanding of modern commercial, mdustnal 
society. 
II. SMITHIAN ROOTS IN HEGEL'S EARLY WRITINGS 
Hegel sought to develop a complete philosophical system. Thus he faced 
the problem of recoucilin g the world of concrete reahty and the Ideal world 
of consciousness, in Hegel's terms the realm of Nature and the realm of 
Spiri t. These are two separa te, parallel, and equivalent worlds. While these 
. . h t be reconciled and the burden 
worlds are separate and dlstmct, yet t ey mus 
. W R S t (1937 pp 118-20 Rae(1895, 
4. Smith's charges of plagiarism ar~exammed by '33' 3~~ \h; char~e first ~ppeared in 
pp. 64-65, and most definitively by ~lOer (1965), P.r· - . 67-69. Stewart mentioned 
Dugald Stewart's Biographical MemOlfof Adam SmtIh (1793, pp. ) h h h . I d t Adam Ferguson as t e aut or w 0 
no names, but Bonar (1932, pp. 68-69) slOg c ou 
provoked Smith to issue the charge. 
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of that reconciliation falls on Spirit. In his J ena Lectures, this reconciliation 
takes two forms: language and labor. Through language, the "name-giving 
power," Spirit takes Nature into its possession and, thus "nature is no longer 
a realm of images internally suspended, having no being. Rather it is the 
realm of names" (Hegel 1983, p. 89-90). 
Adam Smith's opening sentence reveals the role that labor plays in the 
reconciliation of what Hegel calls Nature and Spirit for "the annual labour 
of every nation is the fund which originally supplies itwith all the necessaries 
and conveniences of life which it annually consumes" (Smith 1776, p. lvii). 
Through labor, Spirit wills the transformation of Nature; the ego moves 
from ~ passive to an active state molding Nature, subjecting Nature to man's 
will. Hegel turned to Adam Smith to better comprehend the progressive 
development of the economy, "civil society," and to better understand the 
nature oflabor, reconciler of Spirit and Nature, in the most advanced center 
of civil society, Great Britain. 
Karl Marx, who was not aware of Hegel's Jena Lectures, is particularly 
critical of Hegel's comprehension of the multiple roles played by labor. 
What Marx does recognize is the influence of the classical economists on 
Hegel's later work: "Hegel'sstandpoint is that of modern political economy. 
He grasps labor as the essence of man - as man's essence in the act of proving 
itself: he sees only the positive, not the negative side oflabor. Labor is man's 
coming-to-be for himseifwith alienation, or as alienated man" (Marx 1844, p. 
177). Because Marxwas unaware of Hegel's Jena Lectures, this observation 
is mistaken, for there Hegel sees both the positive and the negative side of 
labor. Hegel drew his grasp of "the positive side of labor" from Smith's 
book,5 In Smith, the expansion of production is dependent upon, driven by 
the division and specialization oflabor. "It is the great multiplication of the 
productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of 
labour, which occasions in a well-governed society, ... universalopulence ... " 
(Smith 1776, p. 11). His famous pin factory example illustrates the 
expansionary effects of the division of labor. Not only does the division of 
labor expand output, but it changes the nature of the work performed by the 
laborer: "In the way in which [pin making] is now carried on, not only the 
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, 
of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades" (ibid., p. 4). Smith 
goes on to describe "about eighteen distinct operations, which, in some 
5. Interestingly, both Smith and Hegel employ a quasi·historical approach when examin-
ing the impact oflabor on early social and economic development. The difference here is that 
Smith is focusing on the way that labor produces both goods and new social relationships-
the three economic classes, with their separate claims to a share of the value of those goods. 
On the other hand, Hegel maintained that human need and the resulting consumption 
created shortages, forcing man to labor, and laboring changed both social relationships and 
human nature. 
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manuf~ctories, are all performed by distinct hands" (ibid.). 
To Illustrate how the specialization and division of labor increases 
?roductivity, Hegel cites Smith's pin factory example in two different places 
I~ ~h~ lena Lectures. First, in his 1803-1804 Lectures, he says that "the 
dlVlSwn of labor increases the mass of manufactured [objects]; eighteen 
men work in an English pin factory .... Each has a specific part of the work 
to do and only that. A single man would perhaps not make 20, could not 
even make one; those eighteen jobs divided among ten men produce 4000 
per day. But from the work of those ten in a group of eighteen there would 
[come] 48000" (Hegel 1979, p. 248).6 And, in his Lectures of 1805-1806, we 
find this brief marginal note: "Universal labor, division of labor, [Iabor-] 
saving. Ten men can make as many pins as a hundred" (Hegel 1983, p. 121). 
For Smith and Hegel, the division of labor not only increases output, bu t 
has additional positive and negative consequences for man. In hisPhiioso-
phy of Right, we find Hegel's mature statement of the causes and conse-
quences of the division of labor: 
The universal and objective element in work, on the other hand, 
lies in the abstracting process which effects the subdivision of needs 
and means and thereby eo ipso subdivides production and brings 
the division of labour. By this division, the work of the individual 
becomes less complex, and consequently his skill at his section of 
the job increases, like his output. At the same time, this abstraction 
on one man's skills and means of production from another's 
completes and makes necessary everywhere th~ depen~ence. of 
men on one another and their reciprocal relation In the satIsfactIOn 
of their other needs. Further, the abstraction of one man's 
production from another's makes work more and more .mec?an~­
cal, until finally man is able to step aside and install machmes In hls 
place (Hegel 1942, 198).7 
How Hegel arrived at this position can be traced back to his treatment of 
Smith's analysis as it first developed in Hegel's Jena Lectures. ~n ~he 
positive side, the division of labor draws men tog~ther, it ~s the mediatIOn 
through which man relates to his fellow men. Smlth descnbes the produc-
. I' CC' "The particularization of 
6. Avineri translates this passage. In t~e fol oWI~g mann fa~ture 18 eople work at the 
labour multiplies the mass of productJo~; In an Enghsh ~an~ide of ;he ;ork to perform; a 
production of a needle; each has a particular and exclUSive "(A' . 1972 P 93) 
single person could not produce 120 needles, ev~n nhot ?~e'''D I vlvnecrpl cter Gr~cn;wcgen 
., h "d' . . f labour" III r, e new ra gra , 7. In hiS article on t e IVlslon a . s the division of labour makcs 
maintains that "Hegel was one ?f the first t.o pOint ou~~ha~~de and install machines in his 
"work more and more mechamcal, ... man IS able tOd s b P B bb gc Ure and dcveloped by place," a feature of the process subsequently note y a a, ' 
Marx (Groenewegen 1987,1, p. 902). 
t 
I 
! 
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tion of a coarse, rough woolen coat which "is the produce of the joint labour 
of a great multitude of workmen ... " to illustrate the point (Smith 1776, p. 
11). Smith concluded that "when the division of labour has been thoroughly 
introduced, the produce of a man's own labour can supply but a very small 
part of his occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by 
the produce of other men's labour ... " (ibid., p. 259). In Hegel, this concept 
of labor as mediator, relating man to his fellow men, is expressed in these 
terms: "Labor is of all and for all, and the enjoyment [of its fruits] is 
enjoyment by all. Each [one] serves the other and provides help. Only here 
does the individual have existence, as individual" (Hegel 1983, p. 120). 
Even though the division of labor performs this positive, mediating 
function, it has important negative aspects as well, because "not only the 
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches, 
of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades." This increasing 
degree of specialization makes work more and more abstract. Within 
Smith's pin factory, no single worker produces pins, instead "the important 
business of making a pin is ... divided into about eighteen distinct operations, 
which, in some manufactories, are all performed by distinct hands" (Smith 
1776, p. 4) . 
. Like his German contemporaries, Hegel was familiar with the work of 
the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Hegel's analysis of the increas-
ingly abstract nature of work in a manufacturing environment shows 
insights which most probably derived, either directly or through the writings 
ofthe other Scottish writers, from Smith's pin factory example in the Wealth 
of Nations. Hegel argued that 
since work is performed only [to satisfy] the need as abstract being-
for-itself, the working becomes abstract as well ... Each individual 
because he is an individual here, labors for a need. Yet the content 
of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors for the needs of many, 
and so does everyone. Each satisfies the needs of many, and the 
satisfaction of one's own particular needs is the labor of many 
others. Since his labor is abstract in this way, he behaves as an 
abstract I - according to the mode of thinghood - not as an all-
encompassing Spirit, rich in content, ruling a broad range and 
being master of it (Hegel 1983, p. 121). 
Smith himself was well aware of the dehumanizing consequences of 
modern factory work. The division and specialization oflabor in the factory 
took a terrible toll on the humanity of the workers. The mind-numbing 
repetition of "a few simple operations, frequently one or two" renders the 
worker "as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to 
become" (Smith 1776, p. 734). Thus the worker's "dexterity at his own 
particular trade seems ... to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, 
4 Iitrt3li'H'=WywrrnnV"mrn m r . :nor F 
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social, and ma~~ial virtues" (i?id., 735~. So great was this evil that govern-
men~ o~gh.t to take. s?~e paIns to relIeve it" (ibid.). For Smith, then, the 
speclall~atIOn an.d dIVISion of labor is a two-sided process- increasing the 
pr?ductIOn of thIngs, while debilitating the producer, the worker. It is on 
thiS very point that Hegel made his first explicit citation of Adam Smith's 
Wealth of Nations. In his 1803-04 Lectures, Hegel pointed out not only the 
abstractness of the work within the factory, but its general dehumanizing 
conse~uences as well. Much of the following quote is Hegel's paraphrasing 
of SmIth's commentary on the alienation of the worker. 
The division of labor increases the mass of manufactured [Objects] 
[etc. quoted above] .... But in the same ratio that the number (of 
objects] produced rises, the value of labor falls; the labor becomes 
that much deader, it becomes machine work, the skill of the single 
laborer is infinitely limited, and the consciousness of the faclory 
laborer is impoverished to the last extreme of dullness; and the 
coherence of the singular kind of labor with the whole infinite mass 
of needs is quite unsurveyable (Hegel 1979, p. 248).8 
In his 1805-1806 Lectures, Hegel again considered the dehumanizing 
effects of the specialization and division of labor, this time emphasizing that 
such abstract work turns the worker into an abstraction:9 "Man's labor itself 
becomes entirely mechanical, belonging to a many-sided determinacy. But 
the more abstract [his labor] becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract 
activity" (Hegel 1983, p. 121). Thus for Hegel, within the modern factory, 
"Labor is one's making oneself into a thing" (ibid., p. 103). 
Subjecting Smith's thoughts to dialectical analysis led Hegel to conclude 
that modern man is less independent, Jess self-sufficient than his primitive 
ancestors. Though man is now less dependent on nature, he has become 
more dependent on his fellow men. Yet even as he becomes more produc-
tive, the value of his labor declines. The worker "works at an abstract labor; 
he wins much from nature. But this merely transforms itself into another 
contingency. He can produce more, but this reduces the value?f hi;, I~b.or; 
and in this he does not emerge from universal [i.e. abstract] relatIOns (Ibid., 
p. 138). . . 
Next, Hegel showed how alienation in the workp.lace spllls.over I~to the 
market place. The proliferation of goods and sefVIces combined With the 
division and specialization of labor requires the introduction of money and 
a monetary system to make the whole system operate. Smith's early 
8 An alternative translation of this is found both in Avineri and in Plant. G 9: This was a point that was well understood by a n~~bcr of J~t~;~:~:~~~~te~:~~ 
philosophers _ something they had deduced from the wnltngs of th 
thinkers (See Plant 1983, pp. 17-24). 
I 
I 
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chapter, "Of the Origin and Use of Money," caught Hegel's eye. Smith 
noted that the division of labor left the producers with a surplus of the 
product they produced, while at the same time a "very small part of a man's 
wants" was satisfied by the "produce of his own labor" (Smith 1776, p. 22). 
The result was that "every man .. .lives by exchanging" (ibid.). However, this 
creates new problems; for "when the division of labour first began to take 
place, this power of exchanging must frequently have been very much 
clogged and embarrassed in its operations" (ibid.). Consequently, money 
was invented, exchange monetized, and "the society itself grows to be what 
is properly a commercial society" (ibid.). In his earlier J ena Lectures, Hegel 
took up Smith's scenario and expanded on it: 
This manifold laboring at needs as things must likewise realize their 
concept, their abstraction; their universal concept must become a 
thing like them, but one which, qua universal, represents all needs; 
money is this materially existing concept, the form of unity, or of the 
possibility of all things needed .... Need and labor, elevated into this 
universal, then form on their own account a monstrous system of 
community and mutual interdependence in a great people; a life of 
a dead body, that moves itself within itself, one which ebbs and 
flows in its motion blindly, like the elements, and which requires 
continual strict dominance and taming like a wild beast (Hegel 
1979, p. 249). 
In his later Jena Lectures, Hegel recognized that modern man's life is 
contingent both on the desires of others for the things produced at his place 
of work, as well as others production of the things that he requires. Driven 
by the relentless search for profits, the capitalist system expands man's 
actual needs; at the same time, it creates false needs, while failing to satisfy 
these genuine human needs. "Needs are thereby diversified; each indi-
vidual need is subdivided into several; taste becomes refined, leading to 
further distinction. (In the production of gOOds a degree of) preparation is 
demanded which makes the consumable thing ever easier to use. And so 
that all the individual's incongruous aspects are provided for (e.g. cork, 
corkscrew, candlesnuffer), he is cultivated as naturally enjoying them" 
(Hegel 1983, p. 139). The production of these goods, to satisfy man's 
growing needs, as well as the creation of false needs; leads to further 
specialization and division of labor. At the same time, it also makes labor 
more alienating. Again, the influence of Smith's commentary on the 
dehumanizing effects of the division and speCialization of labor is clearly 
seen in Hegel's remarks. 
By the same token, however, he becomes - through the abstract-
ness of labor - mOre mechanical, duller, spiritless. The spiri~ual 
element, this fulfilled self-conscious life, becomes an empty domg. 
--
-
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~he po:ver of the Self consists in a rich (all-embracing) comprehen-
SiOn; thiS power is lost. He can leave some work to the machine but 
his own activity thereby becomes more formalized. His dull ~ork 
constricts him to a single point, his work becomes more consum-
mate the more one-sided it becomes (ibid.). 
M~reover, the specialized modern worker is exposed to three new threats 
which were of little or no concern prior to this division of labor - the threat 
of changing fashion, the threat of new technology, and the threat of 
uncontrollable events in foreign countries. 
In his later lena Lectures, Hegel began by examining the effects of 
changing fashion on the workers and their livelihood. Here he was 
el~borating on Smith's analysis, in his chapter "On the Natural and Market 
Pnce of Commodities," of the effects of price fluctuations on "the compo-
nent parts of price." There Smith had written: "The occasional and 
temporary fluctuations in the market price of any commodity faJl chieflyon 
those parts of its price which resolves itself into wages and profit" (Smith 
1776, p. 59). An unanticipated increase in the demand for some goods 
" h augments the profits of the merchants" but "has no effect upon t e wages 
of the weavers" (ibid.). An unexpected decrease in demand not only 
"reduces the profits of the merchants.... It sinks too the wages of the 
workmen" (ibid.). Smith expanded on this issue in "Of the Produce of Land 
which always affords Rent," Part I, of his chapter "Of the Rent of Land." Im~roved agricultural productivity releases labor. from that .sector, and 
Smith explored the diversion of workers into a rapidly expandmg produ~­
tion of luxury goods. He also observed that "the poor, in order to ob~al~ 
food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the rich, and to obtal~ It 
more certainly, they vie with one another in the cheapness and perfection 
of their work" (ibid., p. 164). . 
As he explored this in more depth, Smith discovered that the production 
f 
. d'n the bowels of 
o these luxury goods "the fossils and minerals con tame I .' 
th 
' . t " for the nch IS 
e earth the precious metals and the precIOus sones, '. fundame~tally different from the production of other goods. Here scarcity 
d . . b educed or halted to 
ommates over abundance so that productIOn mayer h 
meet the desires of the we;lthy. "With the greater part of rich people, t e 
chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches" (ibid., ~.172). ~or 
th . h' d ". tly enhanced by Its scarCity, e flC the "ment" of any luxury goo IS grea . 
or by the great labour which it requires to collect any considera?l~ q)uaSntltyh 
. I s" {Ibid.. uc 
of It, a labour which nobody can afford to pay but themse ve . h'd t'fied 
I k f P
ulence" whlc I en I 
rare uxury goods bear the "decisive mar SO 0 , for 
h 
. Th d' to expand production 
t elf owners as particularly wealthy. e nve . S 'th's 
, 'ed Expandmg on ml 
profit, perverts production for genume human ne ' the perver-
commentary Hegel in his Jenenser Realphilosophie II, foresees d r t'shes 
, " I ce the fads an Ie I 
SlOns of modern marketing, planned obso escen , 
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which burst on the scene with increasing frequency, and the like. 
Yet this multiplicity creates fashion, mutability, freedom in the use 
offorms. These things - the cut of clothing, style of furniture - are 
not permanent. Their change is essential and rational, far more 
rational than staying with one fashion and wanting to assert some-
thing as fixed in such individual forms. The beautiful is subject to 
no fashion; but here there is no free beauty, only charming beauty 
which is the adornment of another person and relates itself to [yet] 
another, a beauty aimed at arousing drive, desire, and which thus 
has a contingency to it (Hegel 1983, p. 139). 
Smith noted, however, that changing fashion was not the only circum-
stance which jeopardized the jobs of workers; in fact the division of labor, 
itself the source of expanding output, increased production specifically by 
replacing workers with machine technology. Smith cited "three different 
circumstances .. .in consequence of the division of labor" which increased 
production, the ~hird of which was: "the invention of a great number of 
machines which facilitate and abridge labour, and enable one man to do the 
work of many (Smith 1776, p. 7). Note here that the invention and 
introduction of machinery not only "facilitates" but also "abridges" labor. 
Machinery improves labors' productivity, but machinery is also labor-
saving. Yet what Smith casually referred to as "the abridgement of labor" 
not only saves labor, but robs some workers (the abridged laborers) of their 
livelihood. Furthermore, these inventions also simplify labor, reducing the 
skill required to perform productive tasks. An important consequence of 
this labor simplifying is the reduction of the skilled workers' high income 
down to the much lower wages of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In 
Hegel's view, this adds to the burdens of labor, has further seriously 
alienating consequences for the worker. Machine technology replaces 
skilled labor and renders such workers' skills either less valuable or alto-
gether valueless, thereby destroying the skilled worker's "possibility of 
sustaining his existence." Moreover, 
similar incessant is the search for ways of simplifying labor, invent-
ing o~h~r ma~hin~s, etc. In the individual's skill is the possibility of 
sustammg hIS eXIstence. This is subject to all the tangled and 
complex contingency in the [social] whole. Thus a vast number of 
people are conde~ned to a labor that is totally stupefying, un-
hea.Jthy,. unsafe-m ,:orkshops, factories, mines, etc.-shrinking 
theIr skills. And entIre branches of industry, which supported a 
larg~ class of p~opl~, go dry all at once because of [changes in] 
fashlo~ or a fall III pnces due to inventions in other countries, etc.-
and thIS huge population is thrown into helpless poverty. (Hegel 
1983, pp. 139-140). 
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. H.ere we see one more problem faced by the worker, for his job and 
~lvehhood are not only dependent on events in his own country, but are also 
mfluenced by events in foreign lands as well. Here Hegel is probably 
elaborating Smith's commentary on the role of exports as a "vent for surplus 
production." In Hegel's 1803-1804 Jena Lectures, he remarks that division 
and specialization of labor has turned workers' jobs into "a [matter of] blind 
dependence, so that some far-off operation often suddenly cuts off the 
whole labor of a whole class of men who were satisfying their needs by it, and 
makes it superfluous and useless" (Hegel 1979, p. 248).10 The specialized 
worker thus finds himself, his livelihood, and his job threatened from three 
sources: changing fashion may render his product obsolete; new technol-
ogy may "abridge" his labor; and events in foreign countries, such as new 
inventions or changing tastes, may make his work "redundant and useless." 
Yet thi~, is not the end of it, for Hegel remarks later that "factories, 
manufacturing, base their subsistence on the misery of one class" (Hegel 
1983, p. 166). The misery of the working class, for Hegel, is a two-fold 
phenomena-the alienating, dehumanizing misery of the workplace and 
the miserable poverty resulting from low income earned at work. Smith, 
himself, in his chapter entitled, "Of the Expenses of the Sovereign or 
Commonwealth," gives a vivid description of this second form of misery, the 
consequences of the unequal distribution of income which arises from 
private ownership of property: "Wherever there is great property, there is 
great inequality. For every rich man, there must be at least five hundred 
poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many" 
(Smith 1776, p. 670). Notice that Smith's three great original economic 
classes _ labor, capitalist, and landowner- are resolved byprivat~ prope.rty 
into only two classes-the few rich and the many poor. A defimng 
institutional characteristic of capitalism is private property. Howe~e~, 
Smith saw the unequal distribution of wealth as a potent source of CIVil 
disorder: "The affluence ofthe rich excites the indignation of the poor, who 
are often driven bywant, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions" 
(ibid. ). 
Smith concluded that this unequal distribution is, in fact, the reason that 
government was originally instituted: "The acquisition of v~l~able and 
extensive property, therefore requires the establishment of Civil govern-
ment" (ibid.). Thus in Smith's view, private proper~y, or more acc~rately 
the unequal distribution of private property, reqUires the formation of 
government. But the unequal distribution of wealth which gives rise to the 
, I . . "I thus happens that a far-away 
10 Avineri and Plant give this alternative trans atlon. n 'd h h 
, h h h'th losalis/ied Ihelrnee st roug 
operation often affects awholc classofpcoplc",: 0 avc I cr d I "(Avineri 1972, p, 93 
it, all of a sudden it limits (their work), makes It redundant an usc ess 
and Plant 1983, p, 211), 
I 
:1 
., 
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need for government, influences the very purpose of government. "Civil 
government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality 
instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have 
property against those who have none at all" (ibid., p. 674). This last 
commen t recalls Sm ith' s proposi Hon in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1766 
version): "Till there be property, there can be no government, the very end 
of which is to secure wealth, and to defend the rich from the poor" (Smith, 
1978, p. 404). 
Hegel's commentary on the unequal distribution of wealth and income 
most clearly reflects Smith's analysis of this consequence of private prop-
erty. Moreover, Hegel recognizes the role played by another, uniquely 
capitalist-institution, which Smith had also analyzed-the large scale joint-
stock company. Smith was impressed with the ability of the joint-stock 
company to attract large fina~cial capital, because of the limited liability 
aspect of such firms (see Smith 1776, pp. 699-700). Hegel recasts Smith's 
analysis of the unequal distribution of wealth and income, introducing 
Smith's comments on the joint-stock company, to identify the role played by 
such firms in the distribution process. In Hegel's words: 
The contrast [between] great wealth and great poverty appears: the 
poverty for which it becomes impossible to do anything; [the] 
wealth [which], like any mass, makes itself into a force. The 
amassing of wealth [occurs] partly by chance, partly through uni-
versality, through distribution. [It is] a point of attraction, of a sort 
which casts its glance far over the universal, drawing [everything] 
around itself - just as a greater mass attracts smaller ones to itself. 
To him who hath, to him is given. Acquisition becomes a many-
sided system, profiting by means or ways that the smaller business 
cannot employ. In other words, the highest abstraction of labor 
pervades that many more individual modes and thereby takes on an 
ever-widening scope. This inequality between wealth and poverty, 
this need and necessity, lead to the utmost dismemberment of the 
will, to inner indignation and hatred. This necessity, which is the 
complete contingency of individual existence, is at the same time its 
sustaining substance. State power enters and must see to it that 
each sphere is supported. It goes into [various] means and rem-
edies, seeking new markets abroad, etc., [but] thereby making 
things all the more difficult for one sphere, to the extent that state 
power encroaches to the disadvantage of others (Hegel 1983, p. 
140). 
. Further on, Hegel continues and expands on these remarks concerning 
the growth of government, again clearly drawing on Smith's commentary: 
"EM 
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It is universal w~alth and universal necessity.... [This system] 
condemns a multitude of people to a raw life, to stultification in 
labor a~d to poverty - in order to let others amass wealth and [then] 
to take It fro.m theI?' The inequality of wealth is accepted if heavy 
taxes are levied; this lessens envy and averts the fear of distress and 
robbe~. Aris~ocrats, who pay no taxes, stand in the greatest danger 
of losmg their wealth through violence, since they cannot find 
reconciliation by sacrificing it (ibid., p. 145). 
At ~he end of this commentary, Hegel adds this curt remark, directly from 
Smith "The government wastes its wealth, saves nothing" (ibid.). 
Using Smith's Wealth of Nations, Hegel discerned the contradictory 
characteristics of capitalism, most importantly, the negative, alienating 
aspects of labor in such an economic system. Much of Hegel's commentary 
in his early Jena Lectures foretells Marx's analysis in his Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts. When we remember how impressed Hegel was 
with Sir James Steuart's theory of the statesman, and the need for state 
intervention into the economic sphere; it would be reasonable to conclude 
that Hegel too would call for government intervention into the economy. 
Yet, instead, we see the profound impact of Smith's influence on Hegel's 
thought. For Hegel, the state must minimize its interference into the 
economic sphere, "civil society." In Hegel's words: 
Freedom of Commerce: interference must be as inconspicuous as 
possible, since commerce is the field of arbitrariness. The appear-
ance of force must be avoided; and one must not attempt to salvage 
what cannot be saved, but rather employ the suffering classes in 
other ways. [The state power] is the universal overseer; th.e 
individual is merely entrenched in individuality. C?mmerce ~s 
certainly left to its own devices- but with the sacnfice o~ th~S 
generation and the proliferation of poverty, poor-taxes, and IOStI-
tutions. Yet the [social] substance is not only this regulatory law: as 
the power that sustains individuals. Rather, i~ i~ itself productIve 
[of a] great benefit, the benefit of the whole (Ibid., p. 140). 
Clearly, Hegel is employing Smith's concept of the Inv~sible ~and. It is 
Smith's Invisible Hand, guiding each individual's pursUit of hiS ~~n .self-
interest to do what is required in society's best interest, that IS Itself 
productive of a great benefit the benefit of the whole." Here, for the first 
time we find Hegel working ;oward the concept of the Cunning of ~eason, 
, . . I 't'ngs The Plllioso']Jhy 
a concept that plays an important role 10 hiS ater wn I, . 
of History and The Philosophy of Right. How, then, is Smith'S IOfluence 
expressed in Hegel's later works? 
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III. SMITH'S INVISIBLE HAND AND HEGEL'S CUNNING OF 
REASON 
Hegel's Philosophy of Right concerns the progress of Reason or Spirit in 
society, that is, the domain of objective spirit, and explains the development 
of law, morality, and ethical life. Since Hegel came to understand the 
progress of Reason to be a process of self-recognition whereby the objec-
tification of law, morality, and ethical life are discovered to be dimensions 
of Reason, Smith's conception of the Invisible Hand at work in the market 
system that brings about a result additional to that involved in individuals' 
private purposes was attractive to Hegel. Thus, since much of his concep-
tion of civil society in the Philosophy of Right emerged from his earlier J ena 
work in which Smith's thinking was absorbed and developed in Hegel's 
idealist metaphysics, it is arguable that the notion of the Invisible Hand in 
some fashion underlies its counterpart in Hegel's work, the Cunning of 
Reason. 
Much of the Philosophy of Right justifies this supposition. In the realm of 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), the third and key part of the Philosophy of Right for 
the consideration of economic life, Hegel focuses in large part on civil 
society. He characterized it as the sphere of self-interest, premised on a 
system of needs, whose study in a system of production is the science of 
political economy (Hegel 1942, paragraph 188. All citations refer to the 
paragraph numbers in the Knox translation.): 
Political economy is the science which starts from this view of needs 
and labour but then has the task of explaining mass-relationships 
and mass-movements in their complexity and their qualitative and 
quantitative character. This is one of the sciences which has arisen 
out of the conditions of the modern world. Its development affords 
the interesting spectacle [as in Smith, Say, and Ricardo] of thought 
working upon the endless mass of details which confront it at the 
outset and extracting therefrom the simple principles of the thing, 
the Understanding effective in the Thing and directing it. It is to 
find reconciliation here to discover in the sphere of needs this show 
of rationality lying in the thing and effective there (ibid., 189). 
The fundamental accomplishment of this science, Hegel asserts, is to 
demonstrate that rationality of civil society that itself springs from individu-
als' pursuit of their own self-interest. Thus "in the course of the actual 
attainment of selfish ends ... there is formed a system of complete interde-
pendence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal status of one man is 
interwoven with the livelihood, happiness and rights of all" (ibid., 183). 
Hegel, then, shows the imprint of his study of Steuart and Smith and 
accordingly derives his basic understanding of civil society from E~glish 
·'.J'W'nffmwnr'zmrr rrasw 
w 
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political economy. 
Indeed, in a passage reminiscent of Smith's famous remark about the 
butcher, bre,:er, and ba~e: in The Wealth oiNations (see Smith 1776, p.14), 
Hegel explams the actIvIty of self-interest in terms of a transcendent 
rationality, in keeping with his own conception of the progressive self-
realization of Reason: "The fact that I must direct my conduct by reference 
to others introduces here the form of universality. It is from others that I 
acquire the means of satisfaction and I must accordingly accept their views. 
At the same time, however, I am compelled to produce means for the 
satisfaction of others. We play into each other's hands and so hang together. 
To this extent everything private becomes social" (Hegel, 1942, 192A). The 
emergence of a rationality within the pursuit of individual self-interest, that 
is, is expressly a matter of each individual's association of self-interest with 
the interest of others. Self-interest in effect cannot be solely understood in 
terms of single individuals, since its activity makes other individuals' 
interests internal to its own expression. In a general system of needs 
characterized by the science of political economy, this demonstrates the 
higher purpose inherent in civil society. 
Where men are thus dependent on one another and reciprocally 
related to one another in their work and the satisfaction of their 
needs, subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the 
satisfaction of the needs of everyone else. That is to say, by a 
dialectical advance, subjective self-seeking turns into the media-
tion of the particular through the universal, with the result that :ach 
man in earning, producing, and enjoying on his own account IS eo 
ipso producing and earning for the enjoyment of everyone else 
(ibid., 199). 
This might indeed seem to be Hegel's reading ofSmith~s Invisib.le Hand 
account of the unintended effects of the individual's pursUIt ofself-mterest. 
Smith's argument concludes regarding the self-seeking individual: 
He generally, indeed, neither intends to proronote the publi~ inter-
est, nor knows how much he is promotmg It. By. prefernng th.c 
support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he mtends only ~IS 
. . h t· d stry in such a manner as ItS 
own security; and by dlrectmg tam u ..
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends o.nIY.h.lS own gam, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, I:d by ~n mVlsl?le hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his mtentJOn (SmIth 1776, p. 
423). 
.. H d· t work in the activity of self-
Thus where for Smith an InVIsible an IS a . I f self-inter~st for Hegel a "dialectical advance" similarly dnves thct p a~~oy the interest'to a higher result. Accordingly, while Hegel does no em 
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notion of the Cunning of Reason in the Philosophy of Right, that notion 
nonetheless seems operative there in a fashion reminiscent of Smith's 
notion of the Invisible Hand. 
Moreover, that the notion of the Cunning of Reason appears earlier in 
Hegel's writing-in the "Introduction" to The Philosophy of History-
suggests that attention to it in its earlier context may illuminate Hegel's 
discussion of economic life in the civil society in the Philosophy of Right. The 
"Introduction" presents Hegel's conception of history as the self-unfolding 
of Reason as a rational process. The argument involving the Cunning of 
Reason explains how the "means" of the historical process - the "needs, 
passions, and interests" that are the "sole springs of action" are drawn into 
the progressive development of Reason in history (Hegel 1956, p. 20). 
Prefiguring the thinking of the Philosophy of Right with regard to the 
treatment of civil society, Hegel asserts that "Nothing ... happens, nothing is 
accomplished, unless the individuals concerned, seek their own satisfaction 
in the issue" (ibid., p. 23). 
Yet though "needs, passions, and interests" are the evident agents of the 
historical process, their activi ty presupposes - and obscures - the progress 
of Reason in history. Though the self-unfolding of Reason only gradually 
becomes apparent as an increasing consciousness of Reason in history, 
whose essence, for Hegel; is free development, "[t]he History of the world 
is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom" (ibid., p. 
19). Thus the particular purposes of individuals preoccupy their attention, 
while Reason works out its development behind struggle and conflict: "It 
is not the general idea that is implicated in opposition and combat, and that 
is exposed to danger. It remains in the background, untouched and 
uninjured. This may be called the cunning of reason- that it sets the 
passions to work for itself, while that which develops its existence through 
such impUlsion pays the penalty, and suffers the loss" (ibid., p. 33). In 
addition, then, to the emphasis Hegel develops in the Philosophy of Right, 
where implicit in the self-interest of individuals is the regard for others, 
Hegel here emphasizes that the progressive movement of Reason in history 
brings about a greater condition of freedom generally. Not only is the 
interplay of self-interest productive of a social harmony in civil society that 
suggests Smith's conception in The Wealth of Nations, but this good is 
inc:easingly realized as the pro~ressive development offreedom in history. 
Th.ls g~nera~ ~e:elopment o.f histOry, then, underlies the development of 
obJ~ct,lVe S~I~lt III the domam ~f social life, adding a theory of history to 
Smith s InvIsible Hand conception of social harmony. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hegel's notion of a "dialectical advance" whereby individual "subjective 
I 
I 
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self-seeking" b~comes a "producing and earning for the enjoyment of 
e~eryone else" IS absent in Smith's account of the Invisible Hand. Yet it is 
faIr to argue that Smith's view is more a matter of Hegelian dialectical 
d.evelopment. th~n. it ini~ially appears in its Scottish Enlightenment garb 
Since t~ough IndIvI~uals self-interests are opposed, the successful pursuit 
of self-Inte~est reqUIres that the individual transcend the immediacy of own 
needs, to dIscover what would satisfy another in exchange. Moreover, 
Hegel s complex concept of transcendence [aufgellOben J, which requires 
both the overcoming and preservation of that which is transcended, also 
seems to be atwork in Smith's Invisible Hand thinking. While the individual 
must discover and address the self-interest of other individuals in the 
marketplace, nonetheless it specifically remains a matter of the individual's 
self-interest to do so. Thus a higher form of sociality emerges via the 
contradictory activities of self-interested individuals, though that social 
harmony the Invisible Hand creates still preserves the play of self-interest. 
Though Smith's thinking can appear more dialectical than customarily 
believed, the differences between Smith and Hegel remain significant, and 
it should not be thought that the Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason 
are essentially the same notion. In the first place, Hegel's famous comment 
on the violence of Reason's development in history signals his departure 
from Smith's more complacent Jate Renaissance thinking: History is "the 
slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, 
and the virtue of individuals have been victimized" (ibid., p. 21). The 
Cunning of Reason is not so much a matter of Reason's obscurity in the 
events of history - a conception that itself does fit well with the Invisible 
Hand - but a matter of Reason's unhesitating use of the "needs, passions, 
and interest" as the means bywhich Reason develops,. however irration~1 i~ 
sacrifice of individuals and societies. This, surely, IS not part of SmIth s 
vision since the Invisible Hand harmonizes and reconciles individuals' self-
seeki~g to generate the happiest state of affairs possible. Secondly, Hegel's 
conception of transcendence treats that which is preserved. in ~he ~vercom­
ing of a past state of affairs quite differently than does ~mI.t~ m hl~ relat~d 
thinking. For Smith, that is, self-seeking preserves the IlldIvld~al ~ntegnty 
of the economic agent; while for He~el, indivi~uals' "s~bJectIve ~el:~ 
seeking" as often as not leads to theIr destru~tl?n. Thlr.dly, Sml~h. 
metaphysical universe is essentially made up of indIVIduals, wh."e Hegel SIS 
constituted by Reason itself. II This difference perhaps prOVIdes Hegel a 
. . . . t st to Smith since the devel-
more dynamIC conceptJOn of hIstOry, III con ra ..'... . , 
opment of Reason is not limited by the necessity of maInt~IllIng mdlvlduals 
integrity as agents in economic life. In thePhilo50plzyofRlglzt, finally, Hegel 
. f N Deity and higher Being. The 11. Smith also made reference 10 the WIsdom 0 ature,., . 
. 1·1 r b· g. ng thIS to our allenlJOn. 
authors wish 10 Ihank Professor Elws L. Kha I lor nn I 
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sees it necessary to complement civil society in the domain of objective spirit 
with Reason's manifestation in the State. Even in his defense offree trade, 
Hegel is not reluctant to set out in initial schematic fashion the prerogatives 
of State power in the economy: 
At the other extreme to freedom of trade and commerce in civil 
society is public organization to provide for everything and deter-
mine everyone's labour .... This interest invokes freedom of trade 
and commerce against control from above; but the more blindly it 
sinks into self-seeking aims, the more it requires such control to 
bring it back to the universal. Control is also necessary to diminish 
the dangers of upheavals arising from clashing interests and to 
abbreviate the period in which their tension should be eased 
through the working of a necessity of which they themselves know 
nothing (Hegel 1942,236A). 
Smith's notion of the limited responsibilities of the state is thus narrower 
than Hegel's conception of a state as a further fulfillment of Reason than 
is available in civil society. Accordingly, Hegel's dialectical method again 
distinguishes his thinking from his Smith ian inheritance. Though he 
learned his political economy in large part from Smith, he incorporated this 
understanding of alienation and private property within a framework of his 
own dialectical thinking. The Invisible Hand and the Cunning of Reason 
thus part ways in substantial fashion, despite their other similarities. 
In conclusion it should be appreciated that the nature of Smith's influ-
ence on continental philosophy in the nineteenth century has not always 
been well recognized. Yet a careful review of the development of Hegel's 
ideas about civil society as they progressed from the Jena Lectures to 
Hegel's mature writings reveals more fully the extent to which" Adam Smi th 
is thus aufgellOben - both preserved and transcended - into the Hegelian 
system" [Avineri, 0p. cit.]. Hegel turned to Smith for a deeper understand-
ing of modern commercial and industrial life as it had progressed in the 
most economically advanced nation of his time. Subjecting Smith's Wealth 
of Nations to his own dialectical cri tique provided Hegel wi th a broader view 
of human society-from economy to civil society-and the fundamental 
forces at work in such a society - from the Invisible Hand to the Cunning of 
Reason. Smith, then, occupies a more substantial place in nineteenth 
century continental thought than has generally been believed, though this 
role, in fundamental ways, departs from what has been traditionally associ-
ated with the Wealth of Nations. 
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